“moral issues seem particular, subjective, context dependent, and not open to generalizations” (205). “moral theoryfails to express what truly matters to us” (206).
“In Winch’s eyes the example of Billy Budd shows that the universalizability principle is idle” (206).
“Rather than showing that we can easily do without moral theory, they convey the anxiety we experience when we fail to live our lives in accordance with moral principles” (207).
“although Vere presents a morally convincing argument as to why he ought to adhere to the military code, he does not in any way ‘reject or dismiss the validity’ of the claim that it might be equally correct for someone else who finds himself in an identical situation to act according to the demands of natural justice. The ‘ought’ answering here ‘what ought I to do?’ is not universalizable” (208).
“For philosophers who argue on Kantian lines, Winch’s position is rationally inconsistent. It is impossible to endorse two contradictory judgments: namely Vere’s, that Budd ought to be hanged and Winch’s, that Budd ought not to be hanged. Both judgments cannot be correct. A judgment can only be correct if it is not only correct for me but correct for any rational agent” (208).
“once we concede that the moral problem has been solved, we can no longer uphold the claim that another decision, different from our own, is equally valid, rather we have allowed one to override the other” (209).
“as soon as I recognize the validity or correctness of another person’s judgement, inevitably I begin questioning the adequacy of my own. If I were to recognize another person’s judgement as correct and morally convincing, yet, nonetheless, keep to my own, then my choice would have no moral worth whatsoever. It would suggest a moral indifference: I would have to hold that it is equally right to hang or not to hang Budd” (210).
“it is one thing to understand why Vere arrives at his decision and quite another, to make the moral judgement that his decision is morally convincing and, indeed, the correct one” (210).
“As soon as I make a moral judgement I instantiate the universalizability principle. Namely, I commit myself to saying that anyone who decides not to convict Budd, that is, anyone who decides differently, is deciding wrongly” (210).
“it is possible to understand two logically incompatible justifications of actions [but] it is not possible to argue that there are two logically incompatible correct justifications of actions” (210).
“Rather the [universalizability] principle is concerned with the question of justification. It is self-reflective. It asks whether it is possible to justify an action to myself and therefore to others. In that instant I am no explaining or predicting how others will act but I am asking whether I am justified in regarding my action as binding” (211).
“what explains, does not necessarily justify an action” (211).
“the story does not tell of a moral dilemma but of a moral difficulty, nor does it address the problem of moral virtue but that of rights” (212).
“Vere would only be facing a dilemma if he were unable to find a solution” (212).
“A rational agent should adopt only those ends which are dictated by reason. The ends and principles in question are not given, or external to us but chosen by reason itself. Ethical duties are enjoined by an “inner legislation” and the only kind of constraint involved is self-constraint” (212-13).
“The question he [Vere] is asking is whether—regardless of how strong his own personal moral convictions may be—he has a right to ignore the naval code. The story is concerned with what Kant calls the duty of right and not the the duties of virtue” (213).
“Kant, just like Vere, realizes that we do not live in an ultimately just world—the Kingdom of Ends—which moral theory advocates. Kant is aware that we practical human beings are never able to obtain the moral ideal. The existing legal order is thus never entirely compatible with our notion of virtue” (213).
“Kant believes that in the case of a conflict between duties of right and duties of virtue the former has to override the latter” (213-14).
“To concede a right would be to destroy the basis on which any political order rests” (214).
“Kant argues that we not act virtuously without acting legally, although we may well act in accordance with a principle of right, yet act unvirtuously” (214).
“Vere, like Kant realizes when there is a conflict between ‘rights’ the martial law (which Kant calls private use of reason) and virtue, i.e., moral duties (which Kant calls public use of reason), it is necessary to adhere to the former” (214).
“The story powerfully shows that Vere faces a moral difficulty precisely because he wishes to act in accordance with a moral principle, yet the practicality of the situation prevents him from doing so” (215).
“Were it not for his concern about abstract moral issues, he [Vere] would feel comfortable with his decision” (215).
“Vere’s moral difficulty is intelligible only because he values the ideals expressed by moral theory” (215).
“The situation is tragic not because Vere thinks he acted wrongly, he feels no remorse, but because his decision remains at odds with his moral ideals. . . . The tragedy is that Vere’s world is at odds with the ideal world” (215).