“the Western concept of language . . . opposition of speech [parole] and language [langue]” (99).
grammè [written mark], or grapheme (100).
graphic [manner of writing] (101).
History and knowledge, istoria and epistémè have always been determined (and not only etymologically or philosophically) as detours for the purpose of the reappropriation of presence (101).
simple subjectivity [Subjecktivität] (102).
presences: eidos (to the sight), ousia (as substance), stigmè (temporal), nun (of the the now or moment) (103).
The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing. It is the encyclopedic protection of theology and of logocentrism against the disruption of writing, against its aphoristic energy, and, as I shall specify later, against difference in general (108).
topos noetos, divine understanding (109).
the transcendental signified [which Derrida believes does not exist], is manifested above all in the voice: in a language of words [mots] (109).
The word “being,” or at any rate the words designating the sense of being in different languages, is, with some others, an “originally word” (“Urwort”), the transcendental word assuring the possibility of being-word to all other words (110).
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures (113).
Hegel was already caught up in this game. . . . He determined ontology as absolute logic; he assembled all the delimitations of philosophy as presence; he assigned to presence the eschatology of parousia, of the self-proximity of infinite subjectivity (113).
Writing is that forgetting of the self, that exteriorization, the contrary of the interiorizing memory, of the Erinnerung that opens the history of the spirit (113).