“Peirce’s Sign Theory, or Semiotic, is an account of signification, representation, reference and meaning.”
“Peirce also treated sign theory as central to his work on logic, as the medium for inquiry and the process of scientific discovery, and even as one possible means for ‘proving’ his pragmatism.”
“I define a sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its interpretant, that the later is thereby mediately determined by the former.”
“What we see here is Peirce’s basic claim that signs consist of three inter-related parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant.”
“For the sake of simplicity, we can think of the sign as the signifier, for example, a written word, an utterance, smoke as a sign for fire etc. The object, on the other hand, is best thought of as whatever is signified, for example, the object to which the written or uttered word attaches, or the fire signified by the smoke. The interpretant, the most innovative and distinctive feature of Peirce’s account, is best thought of as the understanding that we have of the sign/object relation. The importance of the interpretant for Peirce is that signification is not a simple dyadic relationship between sign and object: a sign signifies only in being interpreted. This makes the interpretant central to the content of the sign, in that, the meaning of a sign is manifest in the interpretation that it generates in sign users.”
“In speaking of the sign as the signifying element, then, he is more properly speaking of the sign refined to those elements most crucial to its functioning as a signifier. Peirce uses numerous terms for the signifying element including “sign”, “representamen”, “representation”, and “ground”. Here we shall refer to that element of the sign responsible for signification as the “sign-vehicle”.”
“For Peirce, the relationship between the object of a sign and the sign that represents it is one of determination: the object determines the sign. Peirce’s notion of determination is by no means clear and it is open to interpretation, but for our purposes, it is perhaps best understood as the placing of constraints or conditions on succesful signification by the object, rather than the object causing or generating the sign. The idea is that the object imposes certain parameters that a sign must fall within if it is to represent that object.”
“First, although we have characterized the interpretant as the understanding we reach of some sign/object relation, it is perhaps more properly thought of as the translation or development of the original sign. The idea is that the interpretant provides a translation of the sign, allowing us a more complex understanding of the sign’s object. Indeed, Liszka (1996) and Savan (1988) both emphasize the need to treat interpretants as translations, with Savan even suggesting Peirce should have called it the translatant (Savan 1988, 41).”
“Second, just as with the sign/object relation, Peirce believes the sign/interpretant relation to be one of determination: the sign determines an interpretant. Further, this determination is not determination in any causal sense, rather, the sign determines an interpretant by using certain features of the way the sign signifies its object to generate and shape our understanding. So, the way that smoke generates or determines an interpretant sign of its object, fire, is by focusing our attention upon the physical connection between smoke and fire.”
“For Peirce, then, any instance of signification contains a sign-vehicle, an object and interpretant. Moreover, the object determines the sign by placing constraints which any sign must meet if it is to signify the object. Consequently, the sign signifies its object only in virtue of some of its features. Additionally, the sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding on certain features of the signifying relation between sign and object. This enables us to understand the object of the sign more fully.”
“this triadic structure and the relation between the elements is present in all of Peirce’s accounts”
“2.Peirce’s Early Account: 1867–8.”
“Peirce’s earliest significant attempt at an account of signs comes in his 1867 paper “On A New List of Categories” (W2 .49–58). In that account, we find the same basic sign structure outlined above: any sign, or representation as Peirce calls it at this early stage, will have a sign-vehicle, an object, and an interpretant.”
“An important difference here though is how he thinks of the relation between signs and interpretants. In particular, Peirce thought that whilst our interpreting the signifying relation between sign and object relied upon understanding the basis of signification in any given case, he also thought that the generated interpretant itself functioned as a further, more developed sign of the object in question. And of course, as a further sign, it will also signify that object through some features, which again, we must interpret, and generate a further interpretant. As will be obvious, this leads to an infinite chain of signs. If any sign must generate an interpretant in order to be a sign, and any sign is itself the interpretant of some further sign, then clearly, there must be an infinity of signs both proceeding and preceding from any given instance of signification.”
“First, we shall look at the types of sign to which Peirce’s early account gives rise. Peirce thought that “representations” generate further interpretants in one of three possible ways.”
“First, via “a mere community in some quality” (W2 .56). These he calls likenesses, but they are more familiarly known as icons.”
“Second, those “whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in fact” (W2 .56) are termed indices.”
“And finally, those “whose relation to their objects is an imputed character” (W2. 56) are called symbols.”
“An interesting feature of Peirce’s early account is that he is keen to associate signs with cognition. In particular, Peirce claims that all thought is in signs (W2. 213). We can see this from Peirce’s early idea that every interpretant is itself a further sign of the signified object. Since interpretants are the interpreting thoughts we have of signifying relations, and these interpreting thoughts are themselves signs, it seems to be a straight-forward consequence that all thoughts are signs, or as Peirce calls them “thought-signs”.”
“As previously noted, part and parcel of Peirce’s early account of signs is that an infinity of further signs both proceed and precede from any given sign. This is a consequence of the way Peirce thinks of the elements of signs at this early stage and seems to stem from his idea that interpretants are to count as further signs, and signs are interpretants of earlier signs. Since any sign must determine an interpretant in order to count as a sign, and interpretants are themselves signs, infinite chains of signs seem to become conceptually necessary.”
“3. The Interim Account: 1903”
“the 1903 account of signs showed considerable developments to the early account of the 1860s.”
“the 1903 account of signs showed considerable developments to the early account of the 1860s.”
“First, where the early account suggested three classes of sign, the 1903 account suggests ten classes of sign.”
“Second, where the account the 1860s treats the general sign, or symbol, as the main focus of sign theory, the 1903 account counts many more sign types as within the focus of philosophy and logic.”
“Third, Peirce dropped the claim that an infinite chain of signs precedes any given sign”
“These changes seem to be a consequence of developments in symbolic logic made by Peirce and his Johns Hopkins student, Oscar Mitchell, in the early 1880s. As is well known, during this time, and independently of Frege, Peirce and Mitchell developed quantification theory (see Peirce (1883), and (W5. 162–191)). An essential part of this development was the inclusion of singular propositions and individual variables for objects that cannot be picked out be definite descriptions. Peirce treated these non-general signs as indices, which in turn led him to identify the index as an essential part of logic. This made his earlier account of signs seem underdeveloped. (See, for instance, Short (2004, 219–222), Hookway (2000, 127–131), and Murphey (1961, 299–300)). This appears to have led Peirce to take signs other than the symbol more seriously. In particular, it led Peirce to realize that some symbolic signs had distinctly indexical (that is non-general) features. Similarly, symbols with heavily iconic features, especially in mathematics (see Hookway 1985 Ch 6), were more important than he thought. What this meant, of course, was that the account of the 1860s was now woefully inadequate to the task of capturing the range of signs and signification that Peirce thought important for philosophy and logic.”
“By 1903, for reasons related to his work on phenomenology, Peirce thought the central features of sign-vehicles could be divided into three broad areas, and consequently, that signs could be classified accordingly. This division depends upon whether sign-vehicles signify in virtue of qualities, existential facts, or conventions and laws. Further, signs with these sign-vehicles are classified as qualisigns, sinsigns, and legisigns respectively.”
“Any sign whose sign-vehicle relies, as with this example, on simple abstracted qualities is called a qualisign.”
“Any sign whose sign-vehicle relies upon existential connections with its object is named, by Peirce, a sinsign.”
“these sign-vehicles signify in virtue of the conventions surrounding their use. Peirce calls signs whose sign-vehicles function in this way legisigns.”
“Just as Peirce thought signs could be classified according to whether their sign-vehicles function in virtue of qualities, existential facts, or conventions and laws, he thought signs were similarly classifiable according to how their object functioned in signification.”
“Recall that, for Peirce, objects “determine” their signs. That is to say, the nature of the object constrains the nature of the sign in terms of what successful signification requires. Again, Peirce thought the nature of these constraints fell into three broad classes: qualitative, existential or physical, and conventional and law-like.”
“Further, if the constraints of successful signification require that the sign reflect qualitative features of the object, then the sign is an icon. If the constraints of successful signification require that the sign utilize some existential or physical connection between it and its object, then the sign is an index. And finally, if successful signification of the object requires that the sign utilize some convention, habit, or social rule or law that connects it with its object, then the sign is a symbol.”
“This is a trichotomy with which we are already familiar from the early account, and indeed, the examples of icons, indices, and symbols are largely the same as before: icons are portraits and paintings, indices are natural and causal signs, symbols are words and so on.”
“There are, however, additional instances, for example, icons include diagrams used in geometrical reasoning, indices include pointing fingers and proper names, and symbols including broad speech acts like assertion and judgment, all of which suggests a considerable broadening of this trichotomy.”
“by 1903 Peirce was aware that it would be hard, if not impossible, to find any pure instances of icons and indices. Rather, he began to suspect that icons and indices were always partly symbolic or conventional. To try to capture this, Peirce experimented with some additional terminology and types of icon and index. These he called the hypo-icon (see CP2 .276 1903) and the sub-index (see CP 2.330 1903) respectively.”
“by 1903, the simple icon/index/symbol trichotomy was something of an abstraction, and Peirce was aware that any single sign may display some combination of iconic, indexical and symbolic characteristics.”
“As with the sign-vehicle and the object, Peirce thought we could classify signs in terms of their relation with their interpretant. Again, he identifies three categories according to which feature of the relationship with its object a sign uses in generating an interpretant. Further, as with the classification of the sign in terms of the sign-vehicle and the object, Peirce identifies qualities, existential facts, or conventional features as the basis for classifying the sign in terms of its interpretant.”
“If the sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding of the sign upon the qualitative features it employs in signifying its object, then the sign is classified as a rheme.”
“Examples are not straightforward, but one way of understanding rhemes, is to think of them as unsaturated predicates like, “— is a dog”, “— is happy”, “— loves —” or “— gives—to —”, and so on.”
“If, on the other hand, a sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding of the sign upon the existential features it employs in signifying an object, then the sign is a dicent. We can think of dicents is as saturated predicates, or propositions, like “Fido is a dog”, “Larry is happy”, “Fido loves Larry”, “Larry gives food to Fido”, and so on.”
“And finally, if a sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding on some conventional or law-like features employed in signifying the object, then the sign is a delome, or as Peirce most frequently, but confusingly, calls them, arguments.”
“Further, just as we can think of a rheme as an unsaturated predicate, and a dicent as a proposition, we can think of the delome as an argument or rule of inference. Our ability to understand a sign in terms of its place in some pattern of reasoning and system of signs enables us to derive information from it (by deductive reasoning) or make conjectures about it (by inductive and abductive reasoning). So, whenever we come to understand a sign as focusing our attention upon some conventional feature of its relationship with object, that is, enabling us to understand the sign as part of a rule governed system of knowledge and signs etc., we have an interpretant that qualifies a sign as a delome (or argument).”
“The rules for the permissible combinations are actually quite simple so long as we bear two things in mind. First, types of each element are classifiable as either a quality, an existential fact, or a convention. That is, across the three elements of a sign, there are three types deriving from qualities (the qualisign, the icon, and the rheme), three deriving from existential facts, (the sinsign, the index, and the dicent), and three deriving from conventions (the legisign, the symbol, and the delome).”
“Second, the classification of the interpretant depends upon the classification of the object, which in turn depends upon the classification of the sign-vehicle. The rules that determine permissible classifications, then, are that if an element is classified as a quality, then its dependent element may only be a classified as a quality. If an element is classified as an existential fact, then its dependent element may be classified as either an existential fact, or a quality. And if an element is classified as a convention, then its dependent element may be classified as either a convention, an existential fact, or a quality. This leaves us with ten permissible combinations between a sign-vehicle, object and interpretant, and so ten possible kinds of signs.”
“These ten types of sign are simply called after the combination of their elements: an ordinary proposition is a dicentic-symbolic-legisign, a spontaneous cry a rhematic-indexical-sinsign, and so on. Despite its apparent completeness and complexity, however, Peirce was soon to begin rethinking his 1903 account of signs and over the final years of his life, he introduced further complexities and nuances.”
“4. The Final Account: 1906–10”
“Peirce always thought of his philosophy in a systematic and architectonic way.”
“We shall not review Peirce’s account of inquiry here, but as an end directed process leading from doubt-prone to doubt-proof beliefs, Peirce began to see a similar end-directedness running through the semiotic process. This kind of thinking lead Peirce to reassess his account of signs and sign structure: the connection between the process of inquiry and sign chains led Peirce to notice subtleties and nuances that had previously been transparent to him. In particular, it led him to see chains of signs as tending towards a definite but idealized end rather than progressing ad infinitum. Since at the idealized end of inquiry we have a complete understanding of some object, there need be no further interpretant of that object; our understanding cannot be developed any further.”
“The first effect of Peirce’s greater appreciation of the parallels between inquiry and his sign theory is a distinction between the object of the sign as it we understand at some given point in the semiotic process, and the object of the sign as it stands at the end of that process. The former he calls the immediate object, and the later he calls the dynamic object.”
“A neat way of capturing this distinction is as the different objects arising from the “two answers to the question: what object does this sign refer to? One is the answer that could be given when the sign was used; and the other is the one we could give when our scientific knowledge is complete”. (Hookway 1985, 139).”
“4.1.1 The Dynamic Object The dynamic object is, in some senses, the object that generates a chain of signs. The aim of a sign chain is to arrive at a full understanding of an object and so assimilate that object into the system of signs. Using slightly more simplistic terms, Ransdell (1977, 169) describes the dynamic object as the “object as it really is”, and Hookway (1985, 139) describes it as “the object as it is known to be [at the end of inquiry]”.”
“4.1.2 The Immediate Object Ransdell (1977, 169) describes the immediate object as “what we, at any time, suppose the object to be”, and Hookway (1985, 139) describes it as “the object at the time it is first used and interpreted”. The immediate object, then, is not some additional object distinct from the dynamic object but is merely some informationally incomplete facsimile of the dynamic object generated at some interim stage in a chain of signs.”
“Clearly, the immediate and dynamic objects of a sign are intimately linked and Peirce consistently describes and introduces the two together. (See, (CP 4. 536 (1896)). However, the connection between the two is most clear when we consider the connections between sign chains and inquiry. The dynamic object is, as we have suggested, the goal and end point that drives the semiotic process, and the immediate object is our grasp of that object at any point in that process.”
“Just as with the object(s) of the sign, the parallels between semiotic and inquiry result in a similar division of interpretants. As a chain of signs moves towards a final end there are different interpretants playing different but important roles. Peirce identifies three different ways in which we grasp the way a sign stands for an object. He calls these three types of interpretant, the immediate interpretant, the dynamic interpretant and the final interpretant”
“The [Dynamic] Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign. […]The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any mind does act but in the way in which every mind would act. That is, it consists in a truth which might be expressed in a conditional proposition of this type: “If so and so were to happen to any mind this sign would determine that mind to such and such conduct.” […] The Immediate Interpretant consists in the Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction. […] [I]f there be any fourth kind of Interpretant on the same footing as those three, there must be a dreadful rupture of my mental retina, for I can’t see it at all. (CP8 .315 1909).”
“Peirce identifies three grades of understanding. The first grade of clarity is to have an unreflective grasp of some concept in everyday experience. The second grade of clarity is to have, or be capable of providing, a general definition of that concept. The third grade of clarity, though, comes from Peirce’s famous statement of the pragmatic maxim: Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (W3, 266)”
“A full understanding of some concept, then, involves familiarity with it in day-to-day encounters, the ability to offer some general definition of it, and knowing what effects to expect from holding that concept to be true.”
“Although these grades of clarity are part of Peirce’s pragmatism, his greater understanding of the interconnectedness of his thought led him to realize that they were also crucial to his work on semiotic. In particular, he saw the three grades of clarity or understanding as reflected in his notion of the interpretant and of course felt that the interpretant also had three grades or divisions.”
“In the Second Part of my [“How To Make Our Ideas Clear”], I made three grades of clearness of Interpretation. The first was such Familiarity as gave a person familiarity with a sign and readiness in using it or interpreting it. In his consciousness he seemed to himself to be quite at home with the Sign. […] The second was Logical Analysis [and is equivalent to] Lady Welby’s Sense. The third was Pragmatistic Analysis [and is] identified with the Final Interpretant. (CP8 .185 (1909)). Here, then, Peirce identifies the first grade of clarity with the dynamic interpretant, the second grade with the immediate interpretant, and the third grade with the final interpretant.”
“the immediate interpretant is a general definitional understanding of the relationship between the sign and dynamic object”
“The immediate interpretant, then, is something like recognition of the syntax of the sign and the more general features of its meaning. Indeed, Peirce seems to take the immediate interpretant to be “all that is explicit in the sign apart from its context and circumstances of utterance” (CP5 .473 (1907)).”
“the immediate interpretant will involve something like our recognition of grammatical categories, syntactic structures and conventional rules of use”
“The second type of interpretant that any sign must have is the dynamic interpretant. This is our understanding of the sign/dynamic object relationship at some actual instance in the chain of signs.”
“Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as the “effect actually produced on the mind” (CP8 .343 (1908)), or as the “actual effect which the sign, as a sign, really determines” (CP4 .536 (1906)). The dynamic interpretant, then, is the understanding we reach, or which the sign determines, at any particular semiotic stage.”
“the dynamic interpretant is the actual interpretation we make, or understanding we reach, in the first instance of interpretation”
“There is also an interesting connection between the dynamic interpretant and the immediate object. As the understanding we actually reach at any particular point in the sign chain, the dynamic interpretant represents an incomplete understanding, or interpretation, of the dynamic object. More important, though, is that the immediate object of some sign in a sign chain consists of the actual interpretations made previously, that is, it consists of the dynamic interpretants from earlier stages in the sign chain. As Ransdell (1977, 169) puts it, the “immediate object is, in other words, the funded result of all interpretation prior to the interpretation of the given sign”. The dynamic interpretant then, is the actual interpretation or understanding we make at some point in the semiotic process, and also constitutes, along with previous dynamic interpretants, the immediate object, or partial understanding we have of the dynamic object at any particular point in the semiotic process.”
“Peirce describes the final interpretant as, “that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached” (CP8 .184 (1909)). Elsewhere he describes it as the “effect that would be produced on the mind by the sign after sufficient development of thought” (CP8 .343 (1908)).”
“The final interpretant, then, seems to be what our understanding of the dynamic object would be at the end of inquiry, that is, if we had a reached a true understanding of the dynamic object.”
“Peirce’s notion of inquiry is clearly central here. As Hookway points out, we might best define the final interpretant as the understanding: which would be reached if a process of enriching the interpretant through scientific enquiry were to proceed indefinitely. It incorporates a complete and true conception of the objects of the sign; it is the interpretant we should all agree on in the long run. (Hookway 1985, 139).”
“the final interpretant would be the understanding where there is “no latitude of interpretation at all” (CP5 .447 (1905)), that is, where the meanings of the words, the identity of the agents involved and so on, are absolutely determinate.”
“As should be clear, from the connections that emerge from the notion of inquiry, the final interpretant interacts strongly with the dynamic object. The final interpretant, then, is important to our understanding of the dynamic object in a couple of ways. First, it is the point where our grasp of the dynamic object would be complete and, according to Ransdell (1977, 169–170), is where the immediate object and the dynamic object coincide. This represents the full assimilation or integration of the dynamic object into our system of signs.”
“Second, the final interpretant functions as an exemplar or normative standard by which we can judge our actual interpretative responses to the sign.”
“in Peirce’s very final typology. He believes that we can obtain these sixty-six classes, rather in the manner of the 1903 typology, by identifying ten elements of signs and signification, each of which has three qualifying classes, and then working out their permissible combinations. These ten elements include the six sign elements identified above, plus four other elements that focus on the relation between signs, objects and interpretants.”
“In respect of the Sign itself (what we have been calling the Sign-Vehicle), a sign may be either a (i) Potisign (ii) Actisign or (iii) a Famisign. (By the time of the final accounts, Peirce was experimenting with terminology so these types are perhaps more familiar as Qualisigns, Sinsigns and Legisigns).”
“In respect of the Immediate Object, a sign may be either i) Descriptive (ii) Designative or (iii) a Copulant.”
“In respect of the Dynamic Object, a sign may be either (i) Abstractive (ii) Concretive or (iii) Collective.”
“In respect of relation between the Sign and the Dynamic Object, a sign may be either, (i) an Icon (ii) an Index or (iii) a Symbol.”
“In respect of the Immediate Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) Ejaculative, (ii) Imperative or (iii) Significative.”
“In respect of the Dynamic Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) Sympathetic (ii) Shocking or (iii) Usual.”
“In respect of the relationship between the Sign and Dynamic Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) Suggestive (ii) Imperative or (iii) Indicative.”
“In respect of the Final Interpretant, a sign may be either, (i) Gratiffic (ii) Action Producing or iii) Self-Control Producing.”
“In respect of the relation between the Sign and the Final Interpretant, a sign may be either a (i) Seme (ii) Pheme or (iii) a Delome.”
“In respect of the relation between the Sign, Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, a sign may be either (i) an Assurance of Instinct (ii) an Assurance of Experienceor (iii) an Assurance of Form.”
“The reason that Peirce believes these ten elements will yield sixty-six classes is clear enough, the same combinatorial considerations given for the interim typology (outlined above in 3.4) apply here. However, the precise manner and order in which these elements interact will determine what the sixty-six classes of signs will look like in the final typology. Unfortunately, these ten divisions and their classes represent a baffling array of under-explained terminology, and there is little to indicate precisely how we should set about the task of combining them.”
“Even though we may be confident on the number of signs in the final typology, other details are sketchy and underdeveloped, and there still exists no fully satisfactory account of the sixty-six classes.”
“There is, of course, good work on the final typology (see (Burks and Weiss 1949), (Sanders 1970), (Savan 1988), (Jappy 1989), (Muller 1994), and (Farias and Queiroz 2003) for the best of this work), but ultimately, it is not clear that any account will overcome the problems posed by the incomplete and cursory nature of the final account.”
“Indeed, it is not clear that Peirce himself was fully at ease with his final typology and how its elements should hang together. As he himself said: The ten divisions appear to me to be all Trichotomies; but it is possible that none of them are properly so. Of these ten Trichotomies, I have a clear apprehension of some, an unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others, and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others. (EP2. 483)”
“As Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.””
“Primary Literature Peirce, C.S., 1883. Studies in Logic, by Members of The Johns Hopkins University. Ed. Charles S. Peirce. Boston: Little Brown. ––– 1931–36. The Collected Papers. Volumes 1–6. Eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press. ––– 1958. The Collected Papers. Volumes 7 & 8. Ed. Arthur Burks. Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press. ––– 1977. Semiotics and Significs. Ed Charles Hardwick. Bloomington I.N.: Indiana University Press. ––– 1982- The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition. Volumes 1–6. And 8. Eds. Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington I.N: Indiana University Press. ––– 1998. The Essential Peirce. Volume 2. Eds. Peirce edition Project. Bloomington I.N.: Indiana University Press.”
“Secondary Literature Atkin, A., 2005. “Peirce On The Index and Indexical Reference”. Transactions of The Charles S. Peirce Society. 41 (1), 161–188. Burks, A and Weiss, P., 1945. “Peirce’s Sixty-Six Signs”. Journal of Philosophy. 42: 383–388. Farias, P. and Queiroz, J., 2003. “On diagrams for Peirce’s 10, 28, and 66 classes of signs”. Semiotica. 147 (1/4): 165–184. Fitzgerald, J., 1966. Peirce’s Theory of Signs as a Foundation for Pragmatism. The Hague: Mouton. Goudge, T., 1965. “Peirce’s Index”.Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society. 1(2), 52–70. Hookway, C.J., 1985. Peirce. London: Routledge. ––– 2000. Truth, Rationality and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Houser, N., 1992. “On Peirce’s theory of Propositions: A response to Hilpinen”. Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society. 28 (3), 489–504. Jappy, A., 1989. “Peirce’s Sixty-Six Signs Revisited”, in Semiotics and Pragmatics. Gerard Deledalle (ed). p143–153. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Lalor, B., 1997. “The Classification of Peirce’s Interpretants”. Semiotica. 114 (1/2): 31–40. Legg, C., 2008. “The Problem of the Essential Icon”.American Philosophical Quarterly. 45(3), 207–232. Liszka, J., 1990. “Peirce’s Interpretant”. Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society. 26 (1), 17–62. ––– 1996. A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce. Bloomington I.N: Indiana University Press. Müller, R., 1994. “On the principles of construction and the order of Peirce’s trichotomies of signs”. Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society. 30 (1), 135–153. Murphey, M., 1961. The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy. Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press. Ransdell, J., 1977. “Some Leading Ideas in Peirce’s Semiotic”. Semiotica. 19, 157–178. Sanders, G., 1970. “Peirce sixty-six signs?”. Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society. 6 (1), 3–16. Savan, D., 1988. An Introduction to C.S. Peirce’s Full System of Semeiotic. Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle. Short, T.L., 1981. “Semiosis and Intentionality”. Transactions of Charles Sanders Peirce Society. 17 (2), 197–223. ––– 1996. “Interpreting Peirce’s Interpretant: A Response to Lalor, Liszka, and Meyers”. Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society. 32 (4), 488–541. ––– 2004. “The Development of Peirce’s Theory of Signs” in, The Cambridge Companion To Peirce. Cheryl Misak (ed). 214–240. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ––– 2007. . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.”