From Heidegger to Sartre and Psychoanalysis.
“Within the context of Heidegger’s existential ontology, the investigation of Dasein’s struggle for authenticity will be the central focus of this article.”
“While Heidegger was primarily concerned with the question of Being (Sein) rather than the nature of beings (Seiende), he was deeply interested in the interface between philosophy and psychology.”
“Despite Heidegger’s apathy toward psychoanalysis, (see Craig, 1988; Richardson, 1993), his conceptualization of Dasein has direct and significant contributions for psychoanalytic thought.”
“While potential conceptual quandaries between the ontological discourse of Heideggerian theory and the ontical discourse of psychodynamic approaches exist, Heidegger’s existential ontology has profound implications for understanding the ontology of the unconscious and the question of authenticity.”
“Some may argue that psychology is not ontology and that the conceptual link between the two is illegitimate. While Husserl (1950) tarried with ontological psychology (see Cartesian Meditations, § 59), this was not a problem for Hegel, and we are proceeding with the assumption that our understanding of the human condition is grounded in a structural ontology.”
“As comprehensively outlined in Hegel’s Science of Logic (1812), thought is not possible without such ontological structures, namely, the primordial ground of consciousness’ emerging to find itself as the coming to presence of pure subjectivity.”
“Thus, reason is contingent on some prior form of consciousness that necessarily requires an underlying ontology.”
“As Hegel points out, without such an ontological ground, thought could not exist, for subjectivity is the necessary condition that makes thought possible. However, we do not wish to equivocate the ontological-ontical terminology or treat them as though they were interchangeable. My aim is to proceed with a clear respect for the line between ontological/ontical and existential/existentiell.”
“For Heidegger (1927), “Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological” (p. 12). The ontic, that which concerns beings, and the ontological, that which concerns ways of being, are differentiated by virtue of their apophantical and hermeneutical referents.”
“Existential understanding, however, is an understanding of the ontological structures of existence, that is, what it is to be Dasein, and existentiell understanding is a person’s self-understanding, that is, an understanding of her/his own way to be or what s/he is.”
“While Heidegger does differentiate the ontological from the ontical, the ontical can be possible only vis–vis the ontological; thus, our social and individual practices embody an ontology ( Dreyfus, 1991).”
“For Heidegger, authenticity is a uniquely temporal structure and a process of unfolding possibility. It is a state of being that is active, congruent, contemplative, dynamic, and teleological–an agency burgeoning with quiescent potentiality (Guignon, 1984, 1993).”
“As such, authenticity is the process of becoming one’s possibilities; and by nature it is idiosyncratic and uniquely subjective.”
“Can the Being of Dasein be thrown into a deficit world, a world tainted by fallenness and inauthenticity, so much so that it predetermines Dasein’s Being-in-the-world as a falsehood?”
“To what degree is worldhood itself structurally differentiated into various existential modalities that are inauthentic, thereby affecting Dasein’s modes of being and the ways in which selfhood is disclosed?”
“I will demonstrate that the throes of selfhood encompass a dialectical course meandering through experiential modes of authenticity and inauthenticity in which this process is an authentic one; that is, it is the necessary a priori structure of Dasein itself as Being-toward-possibility.”
“1. Dasein and Fallenness”
“In his philosophical treatise Being and Time, Heidegger (1927) offers an existential ontology of selfhood as Dasein (being-there), the concretely existing human being who is there, as part of a world.”
“In Dasein’s original disclosedness as Being-in-the-world, one is thrust into the ontological contingency of “Being-in” (around-world) an environment (Umwelt) and “Being-with” (with-world) others (Mitwelt) and with-oneself (own-world) (Eigenwelt), which underlies all participation, engagement, and concrete involvement with the world that is given in a person’s immediate preoccupations and concerns.”
“Thus, the world itself is constitutive of Dasein’s Being, for “Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein that is a necessary a priori, but it is far from sufficient for completely determining Dasein’s Being” (p. 79).”
“Heidegger explicates that Dasein’s Being takes on a particular character a priori and exists within the modes of authentic and inauthentic disclosedness. He writes,
Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the conditions which make authenticity and inauthenticity possible. (p. 78)”
“The modes of Dasein’s disclosedness are already structurally constituted in Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.”
“However, they are only the existential conditions that make authenticity and inauthenticity possible. Heidegger points out that these two modes of disclosedness must have ownership; that is, they necessarily belong to the subjective, singular Dasein. For our purposes, Dasein, composed of its ontological and existential dimensions disclosed as Being-in-the-world, is to be understood in the context of Selfhood.”
“Dasein’s communal structure lends itself to a participation that cannot be annulled, namely, that of theyness.”
“By virtue of Dasein’s communal character, we cannot not participate in a world determined by the pragmatics of society and the everyday concerns that structure Dasein’s activities.”
“For Heidegger, the question of authenticity becomes intimately associated with the existential character of Dasein as concern and solicitude. He states,
If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then . . . it must be Interpreted in terms of the phenomenon of care; for as “care” the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined. (p. 157)”
“Just as Dasein’s relation to the environment is that of practical concern, Dasein’s relation to the communal world is that of personal concern. As Heidegger explains, this form of concern belonging to everydayness by necessity will ultimately lead to modes of inauthenticity.”
“As the “anonymous one,” the unique-ness of selfhood is diffused and lost in depersonalization and “averageness.””
“Heidegger expounds on another structural element in the ontological constitution of Dasein, that of “fallenness.” This is the universal tendency of human beings to lose themselves in the everydayness of present concerns and preoccupations to such a degree that it only alienates them from their personal and unique future possibilities, thus reducing the fallen Das Man to a mere “presence-at-hand.””
“He posits:
This “absorption in . . .” has mostly the character of Being-lost in the public- ness of the “they.” Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’ (p. 220).”
“At this point, we must further clarify what we mean by Dasein’s falsehood. In his essay On the Essence of Truth, Heidegger (1949) explicates the Greeks’ understanding of aletheia as disclosedness or unconcealment.”
“Truth may be disclosed only from its hiddenness in a clearing that opens a space for unconcealment.”
“Equally, as each space reveals the potentiality for truth to be made known, conversely a closing exists in that truth may be revealed only in the wake of concealment.”
“Such movement of uncovering in the presence of covering underlies the dialectical participation of the nature of truth.”
“Given Heidegger’s analysis of aletheia, how can Dasein be false? From this standpoint, truth and falsity are in reference to unconcealed states of Dasein’s disclosedness, not in terms of their epistemological status.”
“In addition, the false Dasein as Being-in and Being-with “the they,” starts to take on an existential character that is more negative, similar to Kierkegaard’s notion of “the crowd,” or even more pejoratively, the Nietzschean “herd.””
“The Dasein who has fallen into falsehood closes itself off from authentically Being-in-the-world and even more significantly from Being-with and Being-toward itself. In psychoanalysis, this might be chalked up to the defense mechanism of denial, that is, people need to deny the ontological obligations of Dasein in the service of more primordial psychological needs or conflicts, such as psychodynamic motivations surrounding security, attachment, and as Heidegger points out, “tranquility.” But as he continues to point out, this tranquility leads to an “aggravation” and alienation of Dasein from itself.”
“Heidegger states:
When Dasein, tranquilized, and “understanding” everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation in which its own most potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. (p. 222)”
“This dialectical conflict brought about by fallenness then leads to the “downward plunge” into the inauthentic Being of “the they” in which authentic possibility is lost in obscurity and under the guise of “ascending” and “living concretely.””
“Is it possible, however, that this downhill plunge is a necessary one that provides the dialectical movement toward the fulfillment of Dasein’s possibilities? Perhaps this turbulent necessity is the authentic movement of Dasein toward itself as becoming.”
“Rather than falling away from itself, Dasein is falling into itself. But this is possible only if Dasein becomes aware of its possibilities that it hides from itself.”
“2. Dasein in Bad Faith”
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